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Abstract. This paper describes research in understanding the require-
ments for complex information systems that are constructed from one or
more generic COTS systems. We argue that, in these cases, behavioural
requirements are largely defined by the underlying system and that the
goal of the requirements engineering process is to understand the in-
formation requirements of system stakeholders. We discuss this notion
of information requirements and propose that an understanding of how
a socio-technical system is structured in terms of responsibilities is an
effective way of discovering this type of requirement. We introduce the
idea of responsibility modelling and show, using an example drawn from
the domain of emergency planning, how a responsibility model can be
used to derive information requirements for a system that coordinates
the multiple agencies dealing with an emergency.
1 Introduction
There has been an accelerating trend for information systems development to
be based on off-the-shelf products or ERP (Enterprise Resource Planning) sys-
tems. Such systems may incorporate or link with existing information systems,
operated by different parts of a business or by different agencies. Examples of
such systems include medical records systems, so-called ‘enterprise systems’ that
integrate the functions of an enterprise and coordination systems that support
different organizations who are working together on a shared problem.
The requirements for these information systems are significantly constrained
by the system or systems on which they are based. Rather than focus on function-
ality and behavioural characteristics, requirements engineering for such systems
should be concerned with how they can be configured and used to support the
work of an organisation.
Our current research focuses on the engineering of these large-scale, organi-
zational information systems and their use in a socio-technical environment. The
aspect of this research described here is concerned with discovering and under-
standing the requirements for information systems that coordinate the work of
multiple cooperating agencies. The novel features of the work include:
1. A focus on information requirements as the most significant type of require-
ments for complex organizational systems.
2. The use of models of the responsibilities in organizations to support the
process of information requirements discovery.
We argue that the key requirements for many organizational systems are
‘information requirements’ i.e. requirements that define the information provided
to stakeholders to help them do their work, requirements for information sharing
and access control and requirements for the information that is generated. These
are an essential basis for system configuration and for defining the information
in different databases that has to be shared.
In this paper, we discuss what we mean by information requirements and
introduce the concept of responsibility as a natural abstraction that supports the
discovery of information requirements. We discuss how a model of responsibilities
in a system can help understand and analyze these information requirements.
The responsibility models used illustrate emergency planning where several
agencies must be coordinated to deal with some emergency such as flooding or
a serious accident. We show how information requirements for a coordination
system can be discovered from the model. This responsibility-based approach
to requirements discovery is compared with viewpoint-oriented and goal-based
approaches and we present a qualitative evaluation of the work.
2 Information requirements
Current RE methods that support requirements discovery, by and large, assume
that the outcome of the process is a behavioural description of the requirements.
These describe the system’s functionality and set out how the system should
behave in response to events and user inputs. However, we have found that there
are circumstances where a behavioural approach to requirements description is
inappropriate:
1. When the the system is constructed using COTS products or ERP systems.
Here, the planned system behaviour is determined to a large extent by the
underlying generic system.
2. When the requirements are for a system of systems, where there are ex-
isting systems that must integrate with a new system. These constrain the
behaviour of any new system. This is particularly true where the different
systems are owned by different agencies, who may be reluctant to make
changes to them.
3. When the requirements have to reflect the social and organizational context
of a system rather than its operational use. The social and organizational
context establishes the rules, regulations and policies that apply to a system
as well as organization-specific requirements that reflect the power struc-
tures, culture and ethical values of an organization.
One motivation for introducing COTS and ERP systems is to support new
business processes that reduce information processing inefficiencies by sharing
of information across business units. For example, information about students
who apply to a university may be captured on application and automatically
made available to other functions such as examination, assessment and alumni
tracking. Systems may then be configured to ensure that the people involved in
the business processes have access to the information that they need.
The key problem for such systems is understanding the information needs
of the people in the organization who are responsible for the different functions
of the system. These ’information requirements’ are used as a basis for defining
the system data models, business rules, information flows and generated reports.
They should also include knowledge of who needs what information and when
it is required to help avoid information overload and to configure the security
features of the system.
The term ‘information requirements’ is not widely used. Here, we refer to
those requirements concerning information to be provided to system stakehold-
ers including where and how that information is used; or the information that
they are expected to create using the system. These are distinct from both
presentation requirements, which reflect how that information is delivered to
different stakeholders and processing requirements, which define the automated
information processing carried out by the system.
Organizations installing new enterprise information systems usually define
new business process models and attempt to derive the information require-
ments by analyzing these models. However, there have been many anecdotal
reports of major problems with such systems; they have often failed to deliver
the expected improvements. While there are many different reasons for the prob-
lems, we believe that one important factor is that too many organizations rely
on a simplistic notion of business processes:
1. Defined business processes are rarely followed by the people doing the work
in an organization. Almost without exception, ethnographic studies of work
have revealed that business process models are not a good description of
actual operational processes [1, 2]. Individuals and teams modify and extend
their processes to cope with deficiencies in the systems that they use, to adapt
these processes to local circumstances and to simplify exception handling.
2. Business processes are not an appropriate way of representing some kinds of
work. For professionals, much of their work is knowledge-based and reflects
their professional discipline, training and culture. Rather than follow a stan-
dard process, individuals decide how to organize and record their work, with
different people, doing the same job, working in different ways.
3. Business process descriptions do not (and cannot) define all possible excep-
tions and failures that may occur. Exception handling is left to individuals,
who use their detailed knowledge and local information to deal with prob-
lems.
Our own observations, over more than 15 years [3–5], suggest that local pro-
cess changes involve maintaining additional, sometimes redundant, information
to that provided by a computer-based system or using the affordances of the
information representation to support collaboration and communication. These
support resilience, allowing work to continue in the event of system failure and
make it easier for people to help others if staff are busy or unavailable.
We argue then that information requirements cannot just be derived from
business process models. They also require a detailed understanding of how
work is actually done and how information is acquired, used and generated in
its undertaking.
Information requirements, as discussed here, are also profoundly influenced
by a wider class of requirements on a socio-technical system. These were first
identified by the ORDIT project [6] and there called ‘organisational require-
ments’. We now prefer the term ‘enterprise requirements’ so as to avoid any
possible confusion with ‘business requirements’, which reflect the functions and
goals of the business.
Enterprise requirements are those requirements on a socio-technical system
that are derived from the system being placed in a particular social and or-
ganisational context rather than from functions to be performed or tasks to
be supported. Examples of sources of such requirements are power structures,
responsibilities and obligations, control and autonomy, values and ethics. Re-
quirements of this kind are embedded in organisational structure and policies,
often in a way that cannot be directly observed or easily articulated. Therefore,
these requirements are not so much captured as debated.
To illustrate what we mean here, consider the situation in hospitals where
there is perennial (and probably inevitable) tension between the hospital ad-
ministrators and the senior doctors. Information that is required to support
administration is inevitably different from clinical information and providing
that information often requires doctors to do extra work. If doctors are in a
strong position within the organization, they may simply refuse to provide that
information, thus constraining the information system. On the other hand, if
the power struggle favours the hospital managers, then the doctors may comply
with the demands to change the way they capture patient information. The in-
formation requirements depend on the power relationships in the organization
rather than prioritizing stakeholder needs.
We believe that, for a large class of systems, information requirements are the
most important requirements because it is often difficult to devise work arounds
to cope with omissions and inadequate information. Problems are particularly
acute where the information requirements of one stakeholder group are based on
information that should be produced by some other group. If there is a mismatch
here, then it may be very difficult or impossible to recreate the information
required.
For example, in studies of a patient information system, built using a COTS
product, it was found that the information requirements of clinicians were quite
distinct from the information requirements of hospital managers. Managers re-
quired information about why patients were referred for treatment using stan-
dard classifications. However, these were quite different from the classifications
used by the clinicians working in that domain. Reconciling these turned out to
be very difficult indeed (partly because of tensions discussed above) [7].
We argue then, that where there are significant pre-existing limitations on
system behaviour, the RE process should focus on understanding the information
that needs to be provided to stakeholders to allow them to do their job, the
‘enterprise requirements’ that constrain the way that this information is used
and the information that is generated. The focus is not ‘what should the system
do’ but ‘what do the stakeholders need and produce’.
3 Responsibility
For some time, our interests have been in the interaction between humans, or-
ganisational structures and software systems which form constituent parts of
broader socio-technical systems. In particular, we are interested in the influence
which such issues have on the dependability of systems [8].
As part of this work, we have investigated how we can use an understanding
of the responsibilities of agents in a socio-technical system to discover potential
system vulnerabilities that can lead to system failure. In particular, we have been
interested in highlighting the potential for ‘responsibility failure’ where an agent
cannot properly discharge its assigned responsibilities, or where responsibilities
are inappropriately assigned to agents in the system [9]. By a ‘responsibility’,
we mean:
A duty, held by some agent, to achieve, maintain or avoid some
given state, subject to conformance with organisational, social and cul-
tural norms.
The key points in this definition are that a responsibility is a duty, which im-
plies that the agent holding the responsibility is accountable to some authority
for their actions, that responsibilities may be concerned with avoiding unde-
sirable situations and not just with accomplishing some actions and that, in
discharging responsibilities, agent behaviour is constrained by laws, regulations
and social/cultural conventions and expectations.
In some cases, responsibilities may be procedural, where the agent follows
a defined process. However, many responsibilities are knowledge-based and the
agent assigned the responsibility decides how to discharge that responsibility,
based on their knowledge and experience, local circumstances, etc. Even for
procedural responsibilities, agents may have discretion in how to cope with ex-
ceptions, busy periods of work, etc.
One important reason for using responsibilities as an abstraction is that they
are a natural notion that people can relate to. Work is often defined in terms of
responsibilities and, if you ask people what their responsibilities are, they can
usually tell you. People can usually separate their responsibilities at work from
their responsibilities in other areas (e.g. as a parent).
Responsibilities serve as an effective basis for focusing the requirements de-
bate, because of their ubiquity and naturalness. Different stakeholders may have
quite different views about particular responsibilities and by making these re-
sponsibilities explicit, we provide a means to stimulate that debate.
A valid question, of course, is how do you discover and understand the respon-
sibilities in a complex work setting? So far, our understanding of responsibilities
has been based on three complementary approaches:
1. Document analysis. Documents that describe the work of a business such
as plans or process descriptions often, explicitly or implicitly, discuss the
responsibilities of the agents involved.
2. Stakeholder interviews. As discussed above, it is natural for people to talk
about their own and other people’s responsibilities.
3. Field observations. Ethnographic studies of work settings reveal how respon-
sibilities are played out in practice and, in particular, how responsibilities
may be delegated, transferred and shared. We have been involved in such
studies in four areas - hospital administration [9], emergency planning [10],
election systems [11] and, more recently, university administration.
4 Responsibility Modelling
A responsibility model is a succinct description of the responsibilities in a sys-
tem, the agents who have been assigned these responsibilities and the resources
that should be available to these agents to assist them in discharging their re-
sponsibilities.
The domain in which we are currently working is that of civil emergency
management. This involves the emergency services and local and national gov-
ernment working together to cope with some emergency, such as flooding, ter-
rorist attack, aircraft accident, etc. We have been investigating how we can use
a model of responsibilities as a way of revealing planning vulnerabilities and the
requirements for systems support by the emergency coordination centres. The
case studies that we have used have been based on emergency plans for dealing
with extensive flooding.
The role of the emergency coordination centres in the UK is to coordinate
the ‘work on the ground’ of the different agencies involved. This involves pri-
oritizing actions, maintaining an overview of the situation, facilitating informa-
tion exchange across agencies and communicating with the media. The agencies
involved (fire, police, ambulance, etc.) have their own command and control
systems and information systems. Communication between agencies is normally
managed by liaison officers in the coordination centre.
In this case, the requirements are for an information management system that
allows information to be shared across agencies, that facilitates the transmission
of information to people dealing with the emergency and that logs decisions
taken by coordinators. Logging is critical both as a means of learning from
experience after the recovery phase of the emergency has been completed and
as an accountable record of actions.
Our responsibility modelling notation identifies responsibilities, agents (or-
ganizations or roles) who have been assigned these responsibilities and resources
used to discharge responsibilities. Figure 1 is a model of the responsibilities in-
volved in evacuating an area in the face of an imminent or actual threat (from
Fig. 1. Responsibility model of evacuation coordination
flooding). Responsibilities are denoted by round-edged rectangles and agents are
named in angle brackets. Dependencies between responsibilities (such as decom-
position into sub-responsibilities) are indicated by links between the responsi-
bility icons.
Responsibilities have a set of attributes and an associated description that
can take a number of forms, depending on the type of responsibility [12]. For re-
sponsibilities that are normally discharged in the same way, the description can
be a workflow model. For knowledge-based responsibilities, the description is
usually textual. Attributes may include the goal or goals associated with the re-
sponsibility, the context where it is normally discharged, pre and post-conditions
defining assumptions, etc.
To explain Figure 1, Silver Command (the name given to the coordina-
tion centre) initiates an evacuation given situation information (flood warnings,
weather forecasts, etc.) and a risk analysis. The police coordinate the evacua-
tion process and are responsible for safety and security during the evacuation.
If people are trapped, the fire service are responsible for search and rescue but
they may not be involved if the evacuation is in advance of a predicted flood.
Two levels of local authority are also involved. The district council must provide
transport for the evacuees and the county council must provide safe accommo-
dation, food and water, etc. Other agencies, such as the ambulance service, may
also be called on if there are ill or infirm people to be evacuated, but we have
simplified our model to exclude these.
Notice that the responsibility ‘Collect Evacuee Information’ does not have
an agent associated with it. Drawing up the responsibility model revealed this
vulnerability in the emergency plan, since it did not define which agency should
collect this information.
We can also associate resources with responsibilities as shown in Figure 2. A
resource can be information or some physical entity such as a flood barrier, vehi-
cle, etc. In this case, the responsibility ‘Initiate Evacuation’ requires information
resources (named between vertical bars) in order to discharge that responsibility.
Fig. 2. Resources associated with a responsibility
The Environment Agency must provide a flood warning (which indicates when
local rivers may flood in the near future) and a risk assessment, which shows the
areas that would be affected by a flood and so should be evacuated.
5 Responsibility and requirements engineering
We are currently exploring how responsibilities can be used to support the early
stages of the requirements engineering process, namely the discovery of analysis
of requirements from multiple stakeholders. There are three areas where our
work suggests they are useful:
– Understanding enterprise requirements
– Information requirements discovery.
– Stakeholder identification
We do not have room here to discuss all of these but, rather, focus on the
use of responsibility models in discovering information requirements.
5.1 Information requirements
As we have discussed, we believe that for enterprise information systems, the
critical requirements are information requirements. In the case of emergency
management, different agencies maintain different types of information. The
most important system requirements are to identify the information that has
to be shared and how it will be communicated to the people who need that
information.
The nature of emergency management is such that the people involved react
to the situation on the ground in order to discharge their responsibilities; it
is impossible to define an evacuation ‘process’. The information they require
normally comes through liaison officers based in a coordination centre.
To help us understand the information requirements, we ask a range of ques-
tions, prompted by the responsibility model. These are:
1. What information is required to discharge this responsibility?
2. What channels are used to communicate this information?
3. Where does this information come from?
4. What information is recorded in the discharge of this responsibility and why?
5. What channels are used to communicate this recorded information?
6. What are the consequences if the information required is unavailable, inac-
curate, incomplete, late, early?
To see how these questions are used, let us focus on the coordination of evac-
uation of people, which in the UK is the responsibility of the police, working
through a local, mobile coordination centre. When we applied the above ques-
tions to the emergency flood plan for Cumbria (in the north of England), we
derived the following:
1. What information is required to discharge this coordination responsibility?
– A map of the area that is threatened by the emergency.
– A list of ’priority premises’ to be evacuated. These are premises that
are evacuated first because they include people who may not be able to
evacuate themselves. hospitals, schools, care homes, etc.
– A list of assembly points where people should gather. The evacuation
involves people being directed (or if necessary helped) to these local
assembly points from where they are picked up and transported to a
safe location.
– Information about known, unsafe routes in the area.
– Information about premises that are known to have been evacuated.
– Information about the emerging threat situation (e.g. predictions of how
long until flooding occurs).
– Information about the capacity and availability of transport from the
assembly points.
– Information about number of police available to assist with evacuation
and the availability of personnel from other emergency services. If the
emergency is predicted and has not yet happened, there may be no need
for support from other services.
2. Where does this information come from?
– Area map: County council
– Priority premises: District council
– Assembly points: District council
– Known, unsafe routes: Police
– Evacuated premises: Police, Fire service
– Threat situation: Environment agency
– Transport information: District council
– Personnel available: Police, Other services
3. What channels are used to communicate this information?
– Area map: Radio data link to printers in local mobile command centre
– Priority premises: Radio data link to printers in local mobile command
centre
– Assembly points: Radio data link to printers in local mobile command
centre
– Known unsafe routes: Radio from Silver command
– Evacuated premises: Radio from Silver command
– Threat situation: Radio from Silver command
– Transport information: Radio from Silver command
4. What information is recorded and why?
– Information about premises evacuated, area evacuation times, units re-
sponsible for evacuation. (for accountability)
– Information about unchecked premises. (in case of future emergency
calls)
– Information about unsafe routes (to assist evacuation)
5. What channels are used to communicate this information?
– Radio from ground units to local control centre. Email to Silver command
if available, otherwise radio.
– Word of mouth local reporting
6. What are the consequences if the information required is unavailable, inac-
curate, incomplete, late, early?
To assess this, we need to look at each information item in turn. Take, for
example, the list of priority premises to be evacuated.
– Unavailable: Manual premises check required to see if vulnerable people
to be evacuated.
– Inaccurate: Manual premises check may be necessary. Possible delay in
evacuation of vulnerable people. People may be left behind.
– Incomplete: Possible delay in evacuation.
– Late: Information has to be communicated to units in the field rather
than at local coordination centre.
– Early: No consequence.
The information derived from discovering the information required to dis-
charge a responsibility may then be recorded on a responsibility model, using
the approach shown in Figure 2. This may then be used as a basis for debate
and discussion about the information.
The final stage in the process is to translate the information requirements
into system requirements for the system supporting information sharing. We
do not have space to discuss this in any depth here but simply provide some
examples of requirements (and associated rationale) below:
1. The coordination centre system shall be able to import textual information
from the District Council planning system, the Police emergency system and
the Fire Service emergency system. (Different types of information needs to
be shared and this allows for information transfer between agencies).
2. The coordination centre system shall maintain a list of priority premises to
be evacuated for each town in the local area. This shall be updated by the
local council when the coordination centre is established. (The premises list
is maintained by the local government authority but may not be immediately
available outside of normal working hours; While a central list may be out
of date, it is better than nothing.)
3. The coordination centre system shall maintain a list of premises evacuated
along with the time of evacuation and the units involved in the evacuation.
(Allows units involved in the evacuation to be coordinated. Maintains an
audit trail of who did what and when.)
4. The coordination centre system shall notify all liaison officers of new infor-
mation about the threat situation as it becomes available. (Different services
may respond differently to changes in the threat situation e.g. local govern-
ment may withdraw from a situation because they are not equipped to deal
with search and rescue.)
6 Related work
Models of responsibility were first proposed by Blyth et al. in the ORDIT
methodology [6, 13], a graphical notation for describing the responsibilities that
agents hold with respect to one another. Dobson and Strens have also explored
the use of responsibilities in requirements engineering [14, 15].
Dewsbury and Dobson have edited a collection of papers that describe much
of the research undertaken on responsibility, presenting analyses of inappropriate
responsibility allocation in socio-technical systems [16]. In particular, the work
includes proposals for graphical responsibility modelling and pattern-based re-
sponsibility definition [9, 12].
Responsibilities provide a basis for deriving system requirements from differ-
ent perspectives and, in that respect, have something in common with viewpoint-
based approaches to RE. Viewpoints were probably first proposed by Schoman
and Ross in SADT under a different name [17] and the first use of the term
’viewpoint’ was in Mullery’s paper on CORE [18]. CORE is based on infor-
mation flow so is useful as a means of analyzing information requirements, once
they have been discovered. Other researchers took on the general notion of view-
points as a means to discover, organize and analyse requirements from different
perspectives, using different approaches [19–22].
Responsibility-based approaches are perhaps closest to goal-based modelling
approaches, such as i* [23] and KAOS [24]. These are intended to expose high
level dependencies between the goals associated with agents in a given system.
Sub-goals may be derived from higher level objectives and assigned to agents
for completion. Goals are achieved through the recursive achievement of some or
all sub-goals. Relationships between sub-goals express (and, or etc) the possible
ways in which the super-goal may be achieved. Analysis of such models can
examine, for example, whether a super-goal may fail due to the failure of a
single sub-goal (brittleness), or whether a particular agent has been overloaded
with too many goals to achieve.
The notion of a responsibility includes the specification of objectives (goals)
to be achieved in discharging the responsibility. However, there is also an ac-
knowledgment that in complex socio-technical systems, the achievement of an
objective is subject to a range of constraints, that are often implicit. For exam-
ple, doctors discharge responsibilities subject to ethical constraints, companies
operate subject to the financial regulations of their host country. The notion
of responsibility as a duty embodies an embedded assumption that it is how
an agent acts and not just what is achieved that is important. This affects the
information requirements, particularly those requirements that define the infor-
mation that must be recorded when a responsibility is discharged. There may
also be requirements to record information, in some critical contexts, about op-
tions considered and rejected so that the agent holding the responsibility may
be held to account.
In a review of research on goal-oriented approaches. Lapouchnian [25] rightly
states “Identifying goals is not an easy task”. He states that goals are normally
derived from other information that is discovered from stakeholders. Responsi-
bilities are, we believe, a more natural abstraction than goals for requirements
discovery for a number of reasons:
1. Job specifications are often expressed in terms of responsibilities. Therefore,
responsibilities are a common notion across all stakeholders in an enterprise.
While managers and system operators (say) may not necessarily interpret
responsibilities in the same way, they can both, at least, talk about them.
2. Business goals are often not effectively communicated to the workforce in
an organization. Hence they may find it very difficult to distinguish between
professional and personal goals. There is often widespread scepticism in or-
ganizations about business goals.
3. Goals are not, in our view, a natural way to express what we call ’avoiding
responsibilities’. They imply positive action to achieve the goal. A sentence
such as ’my goal is to ensure that the pressure does not become dangerously
high; a much more likely way to express this is, ’my responsibility is to ensure
that the pressure does not become dangerously high’.
We do not claim that our responsibility-based approach is a substitute for
or competes with goal-based approaches. Responsibility modelling operates at a
different level of abstraction from goal-based modelling. Responsibility modelling
could be used as a starting point for goal identification.
7 Evaluation
Evaluating any proposals for novel approaches to requirements engineering is
difficult. There are practical and methodological problems in comparative evalu-
ation, as the baseline knowledge of stakeholders changes as soon as they become
involved in a trial. Even when requirements have been discovered, we have no
way of telling, until the system has been implemented, if these requirements re-
flect the real needs of stakeholders. We may have invented an effective new way
of discovering requirements but unless these are the right requirements, then our
approach is not much use. We cannot therefore clearly demonstrate that focus-
ing on responsibilities leads to better requirements. We can however say that
responsibility modelling is a good way of stimulating requirements discussions
and hence reduce the possibility that requirements are inappropriate.
We can consider the effectiveness of our responsibility-based approach from
several perspectives:
Naturalness: Can stakeholders without experience of requirements engineering
relate to the approach? In this respect, our responsibility-based approach scores
highly. In emergency management, plans are usually expressed in terms of re-
sponsibilities so it is straightforward to understand the concept of a responsi-
bility model. The notion of responsibility and responsible behaviour is widely
used in everyday discourse so people can readily discuss their responsibilities
in a given situation. The questions used to discover information requirements
relate directly to the stakeholder’s job and are therefore easy to understand. By
contrast, notions such as viewpoints are not particularly easy to explain and, as
already discussed, it is not easy to elicit stakeholder goals.
Applicability: How widely applicable is an approach? Because of the pervasive
notion of responsibilities, we believe that this responsibility-based approach may
be used in most socio-technical systems which involve multiple agencies or sev-
eral units within the same organisation. So far, we have developed responsibility
models in the domains of hospital administration, e-voting systems and emer-
gency planning and are working on models of university administration.
Scaleability: Can the approach be used with real rather than simple example sys-
tems? All RE methods suffer from the danger of information explosion where
an immense amount of information is generated. In some cases, this makes it
practically impossible to scale these up to practical systems. As our approach
has been derived from our experience with large-scale socio-technical systems,
we have never started with ’toy’ examples; we have only ever used this to help
us analyse existing, large-scale systems. Of course, the natural structure of re-
sponsibilities helps here - it is everyday practice to decompose and delegate
responsibilities.
User involvement: Have end-users users been involved in the research? In terms
of buy-in from end-users, we are currently working closely with the Scottish
Environmental Protection Agency in developing our approach to responsibility
models. They are particularly interested in developing simple support systems
for use in the field, which reduce the problems of getting the right information
to the right person and the right time.
Complementarity: Does the proposed approach complement other methods of re-
quirements engineering? We believe that a responsibility-based approach can be
used alongside goal-based and viewpoint-based approaches. Responsibilities can
be identified at an early stage in the process and used as a basis for discovering
information requirements. By identifying the agents who hold responsibilities,
stakeholders can be identified and involved in the RE process for the discovery
of more detailed behavioural system requirements.
8 Conclusions
Relatively few complex information systems are now built from scratch but
rather are assembled from existing and off-the-shelf systems. This means that
behavioural requirements of the system are constrained and that the key re-
quirements are the requirements that relate to the information provided to and
generated by system stakeholders.
We have proposed an approach based on the notion of modelling respon-
sibilities in an enterprise that supports the discovery of these information re-
quirements. We argue that responsibilities are a natural abstraction to use in
stakeholder communication and that stakeholders are readily able to articulate
the information they require to discharge their responsibilities. Models of respon-
sibility in a system provide a basis for stakeholders, potentially from different
organizations, to discuss the information that the need to do their job. Hence,
these models can support the discovery of information requirements.
We are in the process of using and evaluating these techniques to support
emergency management. Here, a coordination system is required to ensure that
information is exchanged between the different agencies involved in a timely way.
Our initial discussions with end-users suggest that they can easily relate to a
responsibility based approach and appreciate responsibility models as a succinct
summary of who does what in emergency situations. They have proved to be an
effective way of discovering and analysing information requirements.
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